New Book states that
U.S. Policy Towards Taliban is Influenced by Oil
by Julio Godoy,
Inter Press Service
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PARIS,
Nov 15 (IPS) Under the influence of U.S. oil
companies, the government of George W. Bush initially
blocked U.S. Secret Service investigations on
terrorism, while it bargained with the Taliban for
the delivery of Osama bin Laden in exchange for
political recognition and economic aid, two French
intelligence analysts claim.
In the book "Bin Laden, la verite
interdite" ("Bin Laden, the forbidden
truth"), that appeared in Paris on Wednesday,
the authors, Jean-Charles Brisard and Guillaume
Dasquie, reveal that the Federal Bureau of
Investigation's deputy director John O'Neill resigned
in July in protest over the obstruction.
Brisard claims O'Neill told them that "the main
obstacles to investigate Islamic terrorism were U.S.
oil corporate interests and the role played by Saudi
Arabia in it."
The two claim that until August, the U.S.
government's main objective in Afghanistan was to
consolidate the position of the Taliban regime to
obtain access to the oil and gas reserves in Central
Asia.
They affirm that the U.S. government saw the Taliban
regime "as a source of stability in Central Asia
that would enable the construction of an oil
pipeline" from the rich oilfields in
Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Kazakhstan, through
Afghanistan and Pakistan, to the Indian Ocean.
Until now, the authors claim, "the oil and gas
reserves of Central Asia have been controlled by
Russia. The Bush government wanted to change all
that."
But, confronted with Taliban's refusal to accept U.S.
conditions, "this rationale of energy security
changed into a military one."
"At one moment during the negotiations, the U.S.
representatives told the Taliban, 'either you accept
our offer of a carpet of gold, or we bury you under a
carpet of bombs,"' Brisard said in an interview
in Paris.
According to the book, the Bush administration began
to negotiate with the Taliban immediately after
coming into power in February. U.S. and Taliban
diplomatic representatives met several times in
Washington, Berlin and Islamabad.
To polish their image in the United States, the
Taliban even employed a U.S. expert on public
relations, Laila Helms. The authors claim that Helms
is also an expert in the works of U.S. secret
services, as her uncle, Richard Helms, is a former
director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).
The last meeting between U.S. and Taliban
representatives took place in August, five weeks
before the attacks on New York and Washington, the
analysts maintain.
On that occasion, Christina Rocca, in charge of
Central Asian affairs for the U.S. government, met
the Taliban ambassador to Pakistan in Islamabad.
Brisard and Dasquie have long experience in
intelligence analysis. Brisard was until the late
1990s director of economic analysis and strategy for
Vivendi, a French company. He also worked for French
secret services, and wrote for them in 1997 a report
on the now famous Al Qaeda network, headed by bin
Laden.
Dasquie is an investigative journalist and publisher
of Intelligence Online, a respected newsletter on
diplomacy, economic analysis and strategy, available
through the Internet. Brisard and Dasquie draw a
portrait of close aides to President Bush, linking
them to oil business.
Bush's family has a strong oil background. So do some
of his top aides. From the U.S. Vice President Dick
Cheney, through the director of the National Security
Council Condoleeza Rice, to the Ministers of Commerce
and Energy, Donald Evans and Stanley Abraham, all
have for long worked for U.S. oil companies.
Cheney was until the end of last year president of
Halliburton, a company that provides services for oil
industry; Rice was between 1991 and 2000 manager for
Chevron; Evans and Abraham worked for Tom Brown,
another oil giant.
Besides noting the secret negotiations held between
Washington and Kabul and the importance of the oil
industry, the book describes the role played by Saudi
Arabia in fostering Islamic fundamentalism, in the
personality of bin Laden, and with the networks that
the Saudi dissident built to finance his activities.
Brisard and Dasquie take issue with the U.S.
government's claim that it had been prosecuting bin
Laden since 1998. "Actually," Dasquie says,
"the first state to officially prosecute bin
Laden was Libya, on the charges of terrorism."
"Bin Laden wanted to settle in Libya in the
early 1990s but was hindered by the government of
Muammar Qaddafi," Dasquie claims. "Enraged
by Libya's refusal, bin Laden organised attacks
inside Libya, including assassination attempts
against Qaddafi."
Dasquie singles out one group, the Islamic Fighting
Group (IFG), reputedly the most powerful Libyan
dissident organisation, which is based in London, and
directly linked with bin Laden.
"Qaddafi even demanded Western police
institutions, such as Interpol, to pursue the IFG and
bin Laden, but never obtained co-operation,"
Dasquie says. "Until today, members of IFG
openly live in London."
The book confirms earlier reports that the U.S.
government worked closely with the United Nations
during the negotiations with the Taliban.
"Several meetings took place this year, under
the arbitration of Francesca Vendrell, personal
representative of UN secretary general Kofi Annan, to
discuss the situation in Afghanistan," says the
book.
"Representatives of the U.S. government and
Russia, and the six countries that border with
Afghanistan were present at these meetings," it
says.
"Sometimes, representatives of the Taliban also
sat around the table."
These meetings, also called "6+2" because
of the number of states (six neighbours plus U.S. and
Russia) involved, have been confirmed by Naif Naik,
former Pakistani Minister for Foreign Affairs.
In a French television news program two weeks ago,
Naik said that during a "6+2" meeting in
Berlin in July, the discussions turned around
"the formation of a government of national
unity." If the Taliban had accepted this
coalition, they would have immediately received
international economic aid."
"And the pipe lines from Kazakhstan and
Uzbekistan would have come," he added. Naik also
claimed that Tom Simons, the U.S. representative at
these meetings, openly threatened the Taliban and
Pakistan.
"Simons said, 'either the Taliban behave as they
ought to, or Pakistan convinces them to do so, or we
will use another option.'" The words Simons used
were "a military operation," Naik claimed.
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